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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
Case No. 890087 CA 
JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER, : 
Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for a 
second degree felony. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-2(2)(f)(1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction and final judgment 
entered against appellant in the Third Judicial District Court, 
in and for Summit County, the Honorable Michael Murphy, judge, 
presiding. On December 22, 1988, appellant was found guilty by a 
jury of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, a second 
degree felony, as described in Utah Code Annotated §76-5-205 
(1953 as amended). Sentence was imposed on January 26, 1989. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that 
appellant was guilty of manslaughter rather than the lesser 
offense of negligent homicide? 
2. Whether the trial court committed prejudicial error 
by allowing appellant's statement to law enforcement agents to be 
introduced into evidence? 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution: 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights 
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put 
in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, Utah Code Annotated 
§76-5-205(1)(1953 as amended): 
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Criminal homicide constitutes manslaugh-
ter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of 
another; or 
(b) causes the death of another 
under the influence of extreme emotional 
disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse; or 
(c) causes the death of another 
under circumstances where the actor 
reasonably believes the circumstances 
provide a legal justification or excuse 
for his conduct although the conduct is 
not legally justifiable or excusable 
under the existing circumstances. 
Criminal Homicide, Negligent Homicide, Utah Code 
Annotated §76-5-206(1)(1953 as amended): 
Criminal homicide constitutes negligent 
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal 
negligence, causes the death of another. 
Recklessness, Utah Code Annotated §76-2-103(3)(1953 as 
amended): 
Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or 
the result of his conduct when he is aware of 
but consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise under all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Criminal Negligence, Utah Code Annotated §76-2-
103(4)(1953 as amended): 
With criminal negligence or is 
criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he ought to be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the circumstances exist or the result 
will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to 
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary 
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person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint* 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Addam Swapp and Jonathan Swapp were charged 
by information with the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in 
the Second Degree, a violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-5-203 
(1953 as amended)* (R. 2-5) Trial on that charge commenced on 
November 25, 1988, in Summit County, Utah. (R. 746) The jury 
returned its verdicts on December 22, 1988. (R. 990-993) 
Appellant and Addam Swapp were convicted of the lesser and 
included offense of Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, a violation 
of Utah Code Annotated §76-5-205 (1953 as amended). Jonathan 
Swapp was convicted of negligent homicide, a violation of Utah 
Code Annotated §76-5-206 (1953 as amended). (R. 1094) On 
January 26, 1989, appellant and Addam Swapp were sentenced to the 
indeterminate term as provided by law of not less than one nor 
more than fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. That sentence 
was to run consecutive to the federal sentences they were 
serving. (R. 1417-1426) Jonathan Swapp was sentenced to a one 
year jail sentence which was consecutive to the federal sentence 
he had received* (R. 1327-1431) 
Appellant had previously been convicted of Attempted Second 
Degree Murder, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1114, and 2; Assaulting 
or Resisting a Federal Officer, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§111 
and 2; and two counts of Using a Firearm During a Crime of 
Violence, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(l). These charges 
arose out of this same thirteen day incident as this case but 
involved different victims. Appellant was sentenced to serve ten 
years in federal prison. That sentence is not subject to parole. 
18 U.S.C. §924(c)(l). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early morning of January 16, 1988, Max Lewis, 
who resided across the street from the Marion Stake Center, in 
Marion, Utah, was awakened by a loud noise and the shaking of his 
2 
house. (Tr. 12-2, pp. 88) Later that morning, he went to the 
parking lot of the Stake Center to plow snow. Lewis noticed that 
the building had been damaged. (Tr. 12-2, pp. 88-89) He 
reported this to the Summit County Sheriff's Office. Detective 
Robert Berry responded to the scene and located a carved pole 
that had been wired to the fence on the east side of the Stake 
Center. The pole had been painted red, had nine feathers 
3 
attached and bore an inscription. (Tr. 12-2, pp. 94-95) 
Near the pole, Detective Berry observed a trail in the 
snow. It consisted of several sets of footprints proceeding in 
an east-west direction. He followed the trail through a field 
and ultimately to the property occupied by the extended family of 
4 Vickie Singer. (Tr. 12-2, pp. 96-97) Officers did not enter 
that property. (Tr. 12-2, pp. 103) This was because several 
months earlier Summit County Sheriff Fred Ely had been ordered 
off that property by Addam Swapp. Swapp had pointed handguns in 
the direction of the sheriff. As Ely was leaving the property, 
Swapp shot his handgun into the air. (Tr. 12-2, pp. 118-122) 
2 
The various volumes of transcript are designated by the date 
the evidence was taken. 
3 
It had been almost nine years to the day that appellant's 
father had been shot and killed by law enforcement officers. 
4 
A diagram of the property and an aerial photograph are included 
in the addendum. 
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Later in the day of January 16, 1988, federal 
authorities were contacted by the Summit County law enforcement 
officers. F.B.I. Special Agent Calvin Clegg was able to make 
telephonic contact with Addam Swapp. During the conversation, 
Swapp did not deny his involvement in the bombing. Swapp quoted 
extensively from the Old Testament and indicated that all of the 
events had been revealed to him by God. He refused to leave the 
property. Ultimately, the telephone line into the property was 
severed by the occupants. (Tr. 12-2, pp. 150-159) 
Over the ensuing thirteen days, numerous federal law 
enforcement agents were assigned to the standoff at Marion, Utah. 
High intensity lights were set up around the perimeter of the 
property. As the lights were being set up shots were fired from 
the Singer house. Law enforcement authorities also fired flares, 
had airplanes fly over the property and played loud and obnoxious 
noises through speaker systems. The purpose of those actions 
was to tire the occupants of the property by interfering with 
their sleep. During this period, the Swapp brothers were 
observed carrying firearms around the property. (Tr. 12-5, pp. 
127-130) 
Authorities attempted to negotiate with the occupants 
of the property. A letter from the ATF Special Agent in charge, 
Nolan Douglas, was dropped onto the property from a helicopter. 
The letter stated that Addam Swapp and Vickie Singer had been 
indicted by a federal grand jury and arrest warrants were 
outstanding for the two. He also encouraged the family to 
surrender peacefully. (Tr. 12-2, pp. 216-221) There was no 
response to that letter from the family. 
Several days later, Ogden Kraut, a friend of the Singer 
family, acted as an intermediary. (Tr. 12-5, pp. 229-232) Law 
enforcement authorities requested that Kraut talk to the family. 
(Tr. 12-5, pp. 230-232) Addam Swapp indicated to Kraut that the 
family was expecting John Singer to be resurrected from the dead 
as a result of the confrontation with the authorities. (Tr. 12-
5, pp. 237-241) Kraut reported these conversations to the 
agents. The following day, the authorities had Kraut deliver a 
letter from Utah Governor Norman Bangerter to the family. (Tr. 
12-5, pp. 242-248) On January 27, 1988, Addam Swapp telephoned 
the authorities and indicated that he desired to speak to Ogden 
Kraut. Swapp told Kraut that his response to the governor's 
letter would be ready for Kraut to pick up later that day. Kraut 
went to the Singer property. He was given two sealed envelopes 
containing letters written by Addam Swapp and Vickie Singer. 
(Tr. 12-5, pp. 255-261) Kraut agreed to receive a telephone call 
from Swapp the following Saturday. (Tr. 12-5, pp. 263) The 
letters he received were delivered to the federal and state 
authorities. (Tr. 12-5, pp. 260) 
In his letter, Addam Swapp gave a long description of 
the incidents giving rise to the death of John Singer, he also 
declared the Singer property to be an independent nation. He 
further indicated that action would be taken against those who 
crossed the family's property line. (Tr. 12-5, pp. 114-120) In 
reaction to Swapp1s letter the authorities decided to attempt to 
arrest him on the morning of January 28, 1988. Their belief was 
that if Swapp was captured, the other family members would 
surrender and the standoff would end. (Tr. 12-5, pp. 122-125) 
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The first arrest plan involved the use of the noise 
producing speakers as decoys. The agents were aware that when 
noise had previously been broadcast, the Swapp brothers would 
venture off the property and disable the speakers. Members of 
the FBI Hostage Rescue Team and Utah State Corrections Department 
dog handlers would be in the area when the Swapp brothers left 
the property. The dogs would be released and take down the Swapp 
brothers. (Tr. 12-5, pp. 289-294) When the speakers were 
activated the Swapp brothers did respond as anticipated. (Tr. 
12-5, pp. 298-299) However, when the dogs were released they did 
not attack the Swapp brothers, rather, one of the dogs began to 
attack the F.B.I, agents, the other ran a few yards and returned 
to his handler. After disabling the speakers the Swapps 
retreated to the Singer house. (Tr. 12-7, pp. 232-233, 251) 
In conjunction with this first plan, seven F.B.I, 
agents assigned to the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and Corrections 
dog handler Fred House entered the house on the west side of the 
Singer property (the Bates house) at about 10:00 p.m. (Tr. 12-
7, pp. 9) This was the same house that had been occupied by 
Roger and Suzzanne Bates prior to the bombing of the Stake 
Center. Agents had previously observed family members, including 
the Swapp brothers, enter the house during the previous twelve 
days. In the event that the Swapp brothers entered the Bates 
house on the morning of the 28th, agents would be in a position 
to effect an arrest. (Tr. 12-5, pp. 293-297) 
5 
A diagram of the floor plan of the Bates house is included in 
the addendum. 
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When the first arrest attempt failed, another plan was 
formulated. The agents were aware that the Swapp brothers went 
to milk the family goat every morning. The goat pen was located 
approximately one-half way between the Bates and Singer houses. 
The new plan was to release the dogs from the front door of the 
Bates house as the Swapp brothers left the goat pen. The dogs 
were to take the Swapps to the ground. (Tr. 12-6, pp. 37-42) 
To effect that plan, corrections officers Jerry Pope 
and Fred House moved to the front door of the Bates house when 
the Swapp brothers approached the goat pen. (Tr. 12-7, p. 145) 
The door was opened and the dogs were released. At that time, 
F.B.I, agents John Butler and Martin Brown moved behind Pope and 
House to provide cover. Brown and Butler were armed with 9mm 
automatic weapons. (Tr. 12-7, p. 145) Agents David Edward and 
Richard Intellini were laying prone on a second floor landing 
looking out of a window that faced the Singer cabin. (Tr. 12-7, 
p. 4) 
When the dogs were released, Lieutenant House was 
crouched slightly in the doorway with his right side exposed to 
the Singer cabin. (Tr. 12-7, p. 184) As the dogs ran toward the 
Swapp brothers three events happened almost simultaneously: A 
volley of shots were fired from the Singer house, the agents in 
the Bates house observed Addam Swapp turn and apparently shoulder 
his weapon, (Tr. 12-7, pp. 156-158) and Agents Butler and 
Intellini fired their weapons at Addam Swapp. (Tr. 12-7, pp. 
158-160, Tr. 12-7, p. 29) 
See the diagram and aerial photograph of the Singer property in 
the addendum. 
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Swapp was wounded and retreated into the Singer cabin. 
(Tr. 12-7r p. 99) Immediately after Butler fired his weapon, 
Agent Brown observed House being struck with a round. (Tr. 12-6 
(vol. II), p. 37) Agent Butler grabbed Pope and pulled him into 
the stairwell. (Tr. 12-7, p. 160) The dogs re-entered the house 
as Agent Hugh McKinney made his way down the stairs to give House 
first aid. (Tr. 12-7, p. 29) About that same time more shots 
hit the partially open door. (Tr. 12-7, p. 99) House had 
slumped back into a closet near the doorway with his feet 
blocking the doorway. (Tr. 12-7, p. 162) McKinney, laying 
prone, pulled House's feet from in front of the door and Butler 
was able to close it with the handle of a mop. (Tr. 12-7, p. 
100) While on the ground in a prone position McKinney heard the 
snap of bullets passing over his head. (Tr. 12-7, p. 113) 
McKinney was able to locate two wounds on House but there was no 
bleeding from those wounds. (Tr. 12-7, p. 102) McKinney 
administered first aid, but House did not respond. (Tr. 12-7, 
pp. 101-102) 
After the shooting ceased, Addam Swapp was observed 
approaching the Bates house unarmed. (Tr. 12-7, pp. 241-243) 
Agents ordered him to lay on the ground where he was given 
medical attention. (Tr. 12-7, pp. 264-270) Swapp's wife Heidi 
was observed in front of the Singer cabin yelling at her husband 
to get into the house. (Tr. 12-7, pp. 246-247) At about that 
same time, armored personnel carriers entered the property. One 
blocked the northwest window from which shots were fired. The 
other was used to evacuate the injured Fred House to a waiting 
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helicopter. (Tr. 12-6, p. 24) Shortly afterwards, the F.B.I, 
received a telephone call from Jonathan Swapp. In that call he 
indicated the family was willing to surrender. (Tr. 12-5, pp. 
124-126) Jonathan Swapp and the members of the Singer family 
then left the cabin and surrendered themselves to federal 
custody. 
Fred House was pronounced dead on arrival at the 
University of Utah Medical Center on January 28, 1988. (Tr. 12-
8, p. 145) The State Medical Examiner, Dr. Edwin Sweeney, 
testified that House died as a result of a single gunshot wound 
to his chest. (Tr. 12-8, p. 153) The projectile entered House's 
chest directly below the right nipple and travelled backward and 
downward from right to left. (Tr. 12-8, p. 151) The projectile 
nicked the aorta, which caused the death. (Tr. 12-8, p. 152) 
Dr. Sweeney testified that the bullet entered the body at a 30 
degree angle. (Tr. 12-8, p. 169) Based on the angle of the 
wound and an inspection of the scene, Dr. Sweeney was of the 
opinion that House was standing at a severe angle in the doorway. 
(Tr. 12-8, p. 170) 
A search of the Bates' house subsequent to the 
surrender of the Singer family resulted in the discovery of 
several spent bullets. (Tr. 12-8, pp. 53-54) One was found on 
the floor in the same location where H.R.T. members had removed 
Fred House's clothing and administered first aid. (Tr. 12-8, p. 
If the projectile would have entered at a 90 degree angle, 
House would have been directly facing the firearm. (Tr. 12-8, p. 
170) 
56) A substance found on that projectile tested positive for 
type O human blood. (Tr. 12-8, pp. 58-61) That same projectile 
was found to have been fired from a 30 caliber carbine located on 
a table in appellant's bedroom. (Tr. 12-8, pp. 280-281) A 
photograph of the firearm taken before it was seized indicated 
the sight was set at "250." (Tr. 12-13, pp. 294-295) When test 
fired at 75 yards, the same distance as that between the Singer 
and Bates houses, the weapon fired approximately fourteen inches 
high. (Tr. 12-13, p. 295) Appellant had purchased the firearm 
on Friday, January 15, 1988. (Tr. 12-9, p. 92) 
After being taken into custody, appellant was 
transported by ATF agents to the United States Marshal's office 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Tr. 12-9, p. 57) During the trip, 
appellant made a lengthy statement about the shooting. He 
indicated that as the Swapp brothers were walking back to the 
house, he was seated in his wheel chair in the northwest window 
of the Singer house. Appellant stated that he saw the dogs 
running toward the Swapp brothers. He grabbed his weapon and 
began to fire at the dogs. Appellant denied that he fired his 
weapon at any people. (Tr. 12-9, pp. 63-81) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The evidence failed to establish that appellant was 
aware of the danger to others in firing his rifle at dogs 
attacking the Swapp brothers. Proof of that awareness is 
required to prove manslaughter. However, the evidence was 
sufficient to establish the lesser offense of negligent homicide. 
Appellant's statement to law enforcement officers was 
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inadmissible for two reasons: First, the statement was 
involuntary, in that it was not the product of free will and 
unrestrained choice. Second, appellant asserted his privilege 
against self incrimination, but the agents failed to scrupulously 
honor that assertion, continuing to question him, 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO PROVE THAT 
APPELLANT HAD THE REQUISITE MENTAL 
STATE TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE OF 
MANSLAUGHTER. 
The appellant, John Timothy Singer, was charged with 
Q 
the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree. 
The jury was instructed on the lesser and included offenses of 
9 Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter and Criminal Homicide, Negligent 
Homicide. (R. 1053, 1058) The jury found appellant not 
guilty of Murder in the Second Degree, but convicted him of the 
offense of Manslaughter. (R. 1094) However, the evidence 
introduced at trial was also insufficient to convict appellant of 
Manslaughter. In reviewing such an issue this court must 
consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610 (Utah 1986). This court 
must determine if the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
A violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-5-203 (1953 as amended). 
g 
A violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-5-205 (1953 as amended). 
1 0
 A violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-5-206 (1953 as 
amended). 
a reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt. State v. Warden, 122 
U.A.R. 42 (Utah App. 1989). 
The difference between Manslaughter and Negligent 
Homicide is in the mental state required for the commission of 
the offense. State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142 (Utah 1983). 
Manslaughter is defined in Utah Code Annotated 76-5-205(1)(1953 
as amended). That statute provides: 
Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor 
(a) recklessly causes the death of 
another, or 
(b) causes the death of another 
under the influence of extreme emotional 
disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse; or 
(c) causes the death of another 
under circumstances where the actor 
reasonably believes the circumstances 
provide a legal justification or excuse 
for his conduct although the conduct is 
not legally justifiable or excusable 
under the existing circumstances. 
As can be seenf there are three potential mental states for the 
offense of manslaughter, including "recklessness." State v. 
11 Dyer, supra. Recklessness is defined in Utah Code Annotated 
§76-2-103(3)(1953 as amended). That statute provides: 
Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise under all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
If the evidence is insufficient to establish "recklessness" it 
is by definition insufficient to establish that appellant acted 
either knowingly or intentionally. 
Negligent homicide is described in Utah Code Annotated 
§76-5-206(1)(1953 as amended): 
Criminal homicide constitutes negligent 
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal 
negligence, causes the death of another. 
"Criminal negligence" is defined in Utah Code Annotated §76-2-103 
(1953 as amended) which provides: 
With criminal negligence or is criminally 
negligent with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. 
The risk must be of such a nature and degree 
that the failure to perceive it constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise in all 
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
The difference between reckless manslaughter and 
negligent homicide is the degree of the actor's perception of the 
risk. State v. Dyer, supra. With respect to the nature of this 
difference, the court in Dyer stated: 
The only difference between reckless and 
criminally negligent conduct is that under 
the former, one perceives a risk and 
consciously disregards it, whereas under the 
latter, one fails to even perceive the risk. 
The risk in both cases must be of such a 
degree that an ordinary person would not 
disregard or fail to recognize it. The 
distinction, then, is merely one of the 
degree of perception of the risk. 
671 P.2d at 148 In Boggess v. State, 655 P.2d 654 (Utah 1982), 
the court addressed the issue of whether negligent homicide was a 
lesser included offense to manslaughter. The court made the same 
distinction between recklessness and criminal negligence that 
was described in State v. Dyer, supra. The court then stated: 
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The difference between negligence and 
recklessness is not marked by a sharp 
analytical line. On the contrary, the 
difference generally lies in making a 
judgment as to where on a continuum of 
unreasonable conduct one's behavior passes 
from negligence to recklessness. In essence, 
it is a matter of judging when conduct is no 
longer just gray but dark gray. 
655 P.2d at 658. In State v. Howard, 597 P.2d 878 (Utah 1979), 
the court held that the focus of this inquiry is the intended, 
not the actual victim of the defendant. 
In this case the evidence failed to establish that 
appellant was aware of, but consciously disregarded the fact that 
people were in the Bates house. The officers and agents were 
attempting to prevent the Singers and Swapps from discovering 
their presence in the Bates house. The purpose of their presence 
was to effect a surprise arrest. The agents had entered the 
house through a rear window under cover of darkness. (Tr. 12-7, 
pp. 7-8) That window could not be seen from the Singer's cabin. 
The agents stayed away from the front windows or otherwise 
concealed themselves in order to prevent detection. (Tr. 12-7, 
p. 14) It was not until the front door was opened to release the 
dogs that anything was done to indicate that the agents were in 
house. 
Once the front door was opened, the two correction 
officers, House and Pope, were partially exposed. (Tr. 12-7, p. 
145) Pope remained low enough to the ground so that F.B.I. Agent 
John Butler could fire a shot at Addam Swapp over Pope's head. 
(Tr. 12-7, pp. 158-160) The medical evidence indicated that 
House had his right side facing the open door when he was struck 
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. -*-p bullet, thus limiting his exposure to potential gunfire. 
8, p. 1 70) A1 * •» «5"n was .:. the east (+*o the 
fron* of the h o u s e ) . ( - *i.; :z r *t ha - caused a problem with 
silhouetting the officers m m e upeu uoorway. Furthermore, a 
speaker had been set "^ i#n + *»<> ^rees ^n t>»p north of th^ Bates 
house and was emitting a noise to di vert attention away from the 
Bates1 house. There was a 1 so a pi i le t:i • ee in front :>f the window 
from which the shots were fired. Tl lat tree would have at least 
partially obstructed - » v c r '3 doorway of the Bates house 
f r om t he w :i i: id' ::>w :i :i i a i ">om ( e x 1 >" 9 ? " " " , 
Appellant * nterviewed regarding . e shootout. 
During the interview appellant was never told that anybody, 
othei tl lai i ii!i :idai" i Sw * 
Appellant stated that as Swapp brother- walked to th*- goat 
pen - *ra ™ matching * T P ^ I ; r. t * oo * v speaker that was 
t l l e - - < - . - : • • • 
while • * <- «a<- being milked. Ay i - *• Swapps returned "o the 
cabin, appellant noticed the dogs running toward the Swapps. He 
s. I a \ e ' 1 t 11111 I i i J i t.j h i ie i i l i i , w f * t i i H 111 iii 11! 1 in' 11 < 1 ii I 11 I U P i i I f h <•• d o g s 
through his open bedroom windov *;iie seated in his wheelchair. 
'He indicated tha* f ^  * - - * >
 e a:*y people Ii I the doorway to the 
Bates house - m g a sen oios ml leadii ig 
questions, appellant : acknowledge that the door was open and 
that the dogs must hav* con ie from that house. s* also 
dck now I edtjei I! I lie log ieaJI :i i if er e wds I h.il people wou . *-. ~>^  in 
the house (Tr, 12-:- ;;-- 85-86) The essence of what appellant 
told the agents was that utr was not specifically aware of ai ly 
people in the Bates house, but ought to have been. Appellant 
denied that he ever shot at any people and stated that he would 
rather go to prison than take another man's life. (Tr. 12-9, p. 
80) 
The physical and ballistics evidence was consistent 
with appellant shooting at the dogsf rather than at people in the 
Bates' house. The height of the dogs was about twenty inches at 
the shoulder. (Tr. 12-7, p. 185) The dogs were observed in a 
position about five to ten yards in front of the door. (Tr. 12-
6, pp. 91-92) That point was about twelve inches higher in 
elevation than the base of the doorway where House was standing. 
(Tr. 12-14, p. 22) The sight on the firearm in question was 
found to be at the "250'' setting. (Tr. 12-13, pp. 294-295) That 
would cause one to shoot about fourteen inches higher than aimed 
when fired at 75 yards (the distance between appellant's bedroom 
window and the doorway of the Bates' house). (Tr. 12-13, p. 295) 
As was just shown a bullet fired at the dogs from appellant's 
window would pass through the Bates' doorway at about 56 inches 
from the ground. If appellant was aiming at a point on the dogs 
lower than the top of their heads, the height where the 
projectile passed through the door would also be lower and 
correspond almost exactly to the position where the bullet struck 
House's body. (Tr. 12-15, pp. 209-214) 
In cases that have upheld manslaughter convictions the 
evidence was clear that the defendant was aware of a substantial 
danger. The issue raised in Boqqess v. State, 655 P.2d 654 (Utah 
1982), related to the failure of the trial court to instruct the 
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jury on the lesser offense of negligent homicide. The defendant 
in that case had been smoking marijuana, loading, unloading and 
di'y fIr11 ig a 1 iai id gui i His wife to' 'm to un1oad the gun. He 
told her that it was unloaded. He then pointed it direct .] y at 
her and pulled the trigger. He believed the gun would dry fire 
again. However, the gun went off and killed her. The court held 
that the instruction on negligent homicide was not warranted by 
the evidence. This was because the defenda: - had. never cl aimed 
to be unaware ^f *->»» danger from firearms. He made a statement 
that • - K: r . - • was dangerous to point a weapon at another 
person ana tne trieo • 
In State v. Wessendorf, ., 'n* *pp, 1 989)
 r 
the defendant captured -ttlesnakt a friend's 
iiouse. ' I*- * *- v i 1 i:i s 
pants ji ,: pointed . . :*er people. He then placed t .• snake 
nilci h shoulders. "r.t- ^nn*p : r ".f- child and she 
' • . I la ::i :i lade a * •., ; 
i r a-, indicating that the defendant was aware c: ^i> : . S K tnat 
r.e created, - adopted those findings, The findings 
i : - • n i l in HI I 11 | 'i 11 1  ij[ i t lit sn ii ke 
and placed . - i :ransportation. Others at the 
house told ' defendant that the snake may bite . someone, 
While
 iS snake coiled as ' <i ^ wher pets 
approached Whe^ • - • w placed o r *N- victim's 
> . • i : - c int. kept 
a snakebit* - *
 ST . After *-he girl ^ad leer bitten by 
the snake the defendant made attempts tu remuve the venom. 
-J 9 -
Evidence concerning appellant's awareness that officers 
were present in his line of fire is consistent with the awareness 
of the danger held by the defendants in State v, Dyer and State 
v, Hallett, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980). In Hallett, the defendants 
had been convicted of negligent homicide. They had bent a stop 
sign over and pulled another from the ground. The victim had 
failed to stop at an intersection where the stop sign had been 
altered. The vehicle in which she was riding was struck by an 
oncoming car and the victim was killed. The court found that the 
evidence was sufficient to uphold the conviction. The court 
noted that stop signs are placed at intersections because of 
special hazards. The court then reasoned that the defendants 
should have foreseen that the removal of the stop sign would 
create a situation that was fraught with danger. 
The facts in State v. Dyer are closely analogous to the 
facts of the instant case. In Dyer, the defendant and his 
brother had been involved in an argument and a fight. The 
defendant went to a downstairs bedroom and grabbed a rifle. He 
turned and pointed it at his brother who had followed the 
defendant into the bedroom. The gun was fired. The defendant's 
girlfriend had walked downstairs and was standing behind the door 
frame at the time the gun went off. She was killed as a result 
of the shooting. The defendant was aware that his girlfriend was 
somewhere in the house and the court noted that a conscious 
effort was required to pull the trigger to fire the gun. Based 
on those facts the defendant's conviction for negligent homicide 
was upheld. 
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As previously indicated, the officers in the Bates 1 
house weit- I i y 1 n 11 In liiiili I hi i i | n rsfMii t1 fnirn I'jppe 1 1 am I. and nther 
members of his fainII y, Appellant stated that he was not firing 
his rifle at -- person or persons, but rather at the dogs, who 
w e i e c 1 i a r g I ; S w a; 1 i e i s hp p e 1 1 a i 11 I n d i :: a f e n1 I 11. i I \ i e 
was not actually, but ought to have beei i, aware that people were 
i • • h I s 1 1 1 I e o f f I r e. The evidence failed 1 c: > establish that 
app e 11 a i 11 w a s a w a i e o f • »- r *|r h e n h e shot i n the 
direction of the Bates' house. Consequently, the mental state of 
recklessness was nut established. A p p e n a n t s conviction should 
be reversed and *he case remanded to the di strict court with an 
order to enter judgment and conviction for the offense of 
n e g 1 i g e n t h o m i c i n »•• .- • i , a m i s d em, e a n o i 
Point I 1 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE OF THE CONFESSION HE MADE TO LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENTS. 
Pi i or t:c: t:i i a l , appell ant m*nie
 (i mot i un 1 suppress 
evidence of tl ie nonfession he made to law enforcement agents \ 
transcript of an evidentiary hearing was admitted into evidence 
and • • -notioi I was denied, 111'" ) - , 
evidence was introduced regarding the *rcumstances surrounding 
the taking of the statement and appellant's background and 
psycho 1 nq i C M ] niakei ip. 
The initial statements made by appellant were taken by 
ATF agent*- -Ian Galyan and Fel Ix Garcic Appellant: was placed in 
a i € • t w o a g e i 11 s t .:. j . e I t < :> S a 11 L a k e C11 y. 
Agent Galyan provided appellant w ith ai i advice ol rights form. 
It was read to appellant and appellant was asked to read the form 
himself. (R. 1476, p. 198) Appellant then signed the waiver 
portion of the form at 10:02 a.m. on January 28, 1988. (R. 1476 
pp. 200, 1237) During the drive, the officer asked questions 
about the bombing and siege, to which appellant responded. Agent 
Garcia indicated that initially appellant had a bad attitude, in 
that he acted cocky or hostile. (R. 1476, p. 234) At 10:09 a.m. 
appellant told them he did not feel like talking about the 
bombing, siege or shooting any more. (R. 1476, pp. 202, 222, 
237) 
After about thirty to sixty seconds of silence, Agent 
Garcia began to converse with both appellant and Agent Galyan. 
(R. 1476, pp. 202, 215, 223) Agent Garcia indicated that the 
siege had been very stressful to himself and that he wanted to 
get back to his family in Texas. (R. 1476, p. 223) Garcia also 
described his lack of understanding of the entire incident. (R. 
1476, p. 216) In response, appellant expressed some surprise 
that the agents were from out of state. He told the agents that 
the siege had also been a long ordeal for himself and for his 
family. (R. 1476, p. 223) Appellant then agreed to describe the 
background of the situation. (R. 1476, p. 224) The same agents 
proceeded to put questions to appellant about the same subject 
matter on which he had initially been questioned. (R. 1476, p. 
223) Appellant responded to those questions. (R. 1476, p. 223) 
Prior to this exchange, the agents did not reread the Miranda 
warnings or remind appellant of those warnings. (R. 1476, p. 
223) 
— - Jnited States Marshal's off T I P in Salt Lake City 
-. , . : e m e m wii*. t a k e n I i nim a p p e l l a n t , (H, N ' t . , p , 
226) Two investigators from the Utah State Attorney General's 
Off ice, Ron Milxei amu Sharon Esplinf were present with Agent 
Garcia, Prior tn makino t-hat ^tatemer* appellant was reminded 
of * - v - .. -• rights * - th^ responded to 
the agent f :uestiom * >* -a* • h n i:i lg the 
trip + i,v. Lake. ( . jne oid the agents 
inform - Singe* * * i * t ^ offense for which he was 
under dirre. -v - • * • had been 
injured, (H, 1 - • . t 
At tJ v- - arrest, appellan* v;- ^ twenty-one 
year old pa raj: • •• . 
confined to a wheel chair since he was seventeei -* tha- a<:e 
he had been struck in the Ivu k h1 a tree th; • v- *-ac C M -i* • -
resM I f i >uj (lai'd 1 ys ; i >* I, > U j\ I 4 Mi ** p- • - •* • 
h a d J i v e d h i s e n t i r e lite o n t h e p r o p e r t y in M a r i o n , U t a h , "w I t h 
h i s f a m i l y < h I 4 -'«« n "h l A p p e l l a n t ' s f a t h e r r e m o v e d h i m 
( i u b J in i " i i n HI i i v> i n in i n w . I i in i ' \ n i «j ' l i i
 ( ji 9 ) -* w a s 
educated by his lather and mother at home. The subjects taught 
were limited to reading, writing, arithmetic and scriptures 
ijui i I s< 'ho*»I at nqe s I H I een 
A;:t- several years of educating their children a n^ e, 
appella *'- parents refused to allow the local authorities, 
• ii»ilejr tu ie^t tlit ch i J dren * M: educational 
progress. During that time, appellant s father > ook < seccr.d 
wife. She and her children moved onto the Siiv^r 
Civil and juvenile proceedings were initiated against appellant's 
father. As a result of not appearing in court over these 
matters, a warrant of arrest had been issued for appellant's 
father. During an arrest attempt in 1979, appellant's father was 
shot and killed by law enforcement officers. (R. 1476, p. 103) 
Appellant indicated that he had no prior experience or education 
in relation to the criminal law or the criminal justice system. 
(R. 1476, pp. 98-100) 
Appellant testified at the hearing on the motion to 
suppress that when the Miranda warnings were given, he did not 
understand them. (R. 1476, p. 109) Neither did he understand 
that those statements would be used against him in court. (R. 
1476, p. Ill) Appellant stated that at the time of his arrest he 
was upset, angry and in shock. (R. 1476, p. 108) He stated that 
he felt the same way that he did when his father had been shot 
and killed about nine years earlier. (R. 1476, p. 108) 
Appellant described the siege as a very upsetting 
experience. Fifteen people were living in a four bedroom cabin. 
(R. 1476, p. 104) Law enforcement authorities had placed bright 
lights around the house which were turned on at night. Flares 
were shot off throughout the night and snowmobiles were operating 
around the house at all times of day and night. (R. 1476, p. 
105) Loud noises were also made during several nights, including 
the early morning hours of the date of the arrest. This noise 
caused tension and headaches in appellant and other family 
members. (R. 1476, p. 107) 
-24-
A psychologist, Michael DeCaria, testified that he had 
given appel int. a full battery of psychological tests. (R. 1 476, 
p 123) Those tests included verbal interviews involving a 
mental status examination • ,-sv-hol ogioal interview, U"i , 114 'I-I, 
p. 1 31) Objective v*-** + p; -. t.sis were also given to appellant. 
Those tests included: < Minnesota ** -iphasic Personality 
i n v e * • - e Ta y I o r Jo h nsoi i * a:i .d the Wex 1 e :i * 
Adul: inte..lgence Scale Revised. 4 "t 1 31 ) Based on 
these tests and evaluations, >r eCar; reached several 
conr - . * (R 
i •* ^  i.40) Appellant was ; ^  ol* i .^i-v* iecisions based on 
rational intellect - .ppellar* was unable to 
i • - 4 4 ) F i i"i a 1 i y
 r 
appellant would have beer' unabl* v • t- a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of a constitutional right. (R. 1476, p. 146) 
A. 
APPELLANT'S CONFESSION WAS INVOLUNTARY AS IT 
WAS NOT THE PRODUCT OF HIS FREE AND 
UNRESTRAINED CHOICE. 
Miller v. Fenton, 4 .' 4 II, I 1 itN ( 1 y8 li ) , t he Court 
d i s cus s ed t h e n a t u r e : £ 11 :i e factual review of a claimed 
involuntary confession Thp confession had been introduced in a 
: "• - • - » in .ri federal habeas corpus 
proceeding. i;; discussing nature of an involuntary 
^nfessio" * K^ C.*^ :r' noted that due process typn n< malyris 
. .;•- though .: n Amendment privilege against 
self incrimination is involved, the evidentiary use of an 
involuntary confessioi i has heei i i eooan i - • inns, of 
fundamental fairness. The Court described two types of 
involuntary confession cases. The first type of case is one in 
which the police conduct is inherently coercive. The second type 
of case, applicable here, occurs: 
. . .when the interrogation techniques were 
improper only because, in the particular 
circumstances of the case the confession is 
unlikely to have been the product of a free 
and rational will. 
474 U.S. at 104. 
In evaluating such a situation, the background and 
mental state of appellant are of critical importance. However, 
the actions of the law enforcement authorities must be causally 
related to the confession. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 104 
(1986). In that case, the Court recognized that the coercive 
conduct may consist of subtle forms of psychological persuasion. 
The mental condition of the defendant then becomes a significant 
factor in determining if this causal relation exists. 
The Court has also indicated that a confession is 
coerced if it is not the product of free will and a rational 
intellect. Mincev v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). In Mincey, 
supra, the Court held that this determination must be based on 
all of the facts and circumstances of the case. The defendant in 
that case had been wounded in a shoot-out with the police. He 
was in intensive care and testified that he was suffering from 
unbearable pain. In finding that the defendant's will had been 
overborne, the Court noted that the defendant was at the mercy of 
the police. The defendant could not leave, nor could he escape 
the thrust of the interrogation. Furthermore, he was in pain and 
in shock, thus, his statements were inadmissible. 
determining the voluntariness f a onfession or 
s t al ement - %' * u\ \ - -J t \\c\\ \ he 
totality ^cumstances be considered. State v. Strain, 
779 P.2d . . 1989) >• aumber < t factors have been recognized 
t h e -11 c o i i s i d e i i i i m a k i n g t h a t 
determination. State v. Johnson, 83 P. 2d 1010 (1938), the 
court noted: 
In determining .. . . . *• confession was 
voluntary thert IUUJ&L be taken into 
consideration the age and intelligence of the 
witness, the place and conditions under which 
the statement was made, the circumstances 
that invoked the conversation, as well as the 
nature, content, and import of the statement 
itself, 
?idition to thes° factorr ^he ecr~t :~ 
State v. Hunt , t 9 indicated t ^~' * ;AC 
defendant ^ . .state ui nunc ^ 
- * * -onfused or fearful, and s y . r experience with 
the police and • tie criminal process" should also be considered. 
!n othei words, the determine!t ion of voluntariness must tulu< inln 
at count i characteristics of the defendant and" the 
circumstances of *:* interrogation. State v. Strain, supra. 
111 1 I n •• v ,M 4 i *pt 1 I i i n t Win f w e n t y u i i e 
yeai IJ oid. .- a,i ;t*?n educated a: h*-rne by his parents since age 
five, Th.-> « schooling ended when appellant was sixteei i He 
h a d n o e d u c a t i o n or <|U JI I H I H H w i t h I In i i iiiiiiuul n o t i c e s y s t e m . 
In addition, the psychological evidence indicated that appellant 
was very susceptible * coercion (K - ;~ -p. 140-141), and 
Hi1 • iowever, this may 
have been caused by appellant's complete ] ack of any formal 
education. Appellant's family was his exclusive source of 
information. Finally, he was also suffering from clinical 
depression, which causes people to act recklessly. 
The agents employed a subtle form of coercion. This 
must be considered in light of appellant's mental state. Miller 
v. Fenton, supra. Appellant initially was hostile to the agents. 
(R. 1476, p. 234) He subsequently declined to answer the agents' 
questions. (R. 1476, p. 302) Agent Garcia then began to discuss 
his family and his own confusion over the events of the past 
several days. (R. 1476, p. 216) The agent's obvious intent in 
initiating this conversation was to convince appellant that the 
siege had placed the two of them in very similar situations. The 
agent created an impression with appellant that the two of them 
had a great deal in common. Thus, an apparent bond or friendship 
was created. 
Furthermore, the expression of ignorance of the cause 
of the situation could only have been intended to give appellant 
the opportunity to start talking about the death of his father. 
This is the event that the family claimed had ultimately lead to 
the bombing and siege. These discussions about the death of John 
Singer had been the central theme of all of the communications 
12 
received from the Singer home during the course of the siege. 
Once appellant was talking about his father's death and the other 
See the testimony of individuals receiving communications from 
the Singer family: Calvin Clegg's telephone conversations with 
Addam Swapp; Reporter Douglas Palmer; Reporter Charles Gibbs; 
letters written by Addam Swapp in response to the letter from 
Governor Norman Bangerter. 
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transgressions that his family had suffered at the hands of their 
neighbors matter * ieaa m m intu discussions 
Appellant inabil:4\ t : *-,: '': '< tv\* vt coercion 
•. > verified r. ,*M^- psychological evidence, fne or"'ertivp ^st:.s 
,t : ;. . _i;ists indicated that appellant was 
extremely gullible and that * ifficulty generalizing from 
one • uation * another, (R. i4/o, p, 1 <7 14 VI Tin pvidenr.e 
.3. t .. i -^  that appellant had trouble predicting the 
consequences of h i s act ions. (R ] 4 7 6 , p, J 3 8 ) Thes e factors 
lead Dr. DeCar ia to the cone] us ioi t t ha I appe 1 J an t " s dec I s I on 11•> 
speak wi*. '-he A T F agents would not have been based on the 
application - ational intellect. (R. 14 76, p. 143 I The 
ultimate conclusion WJ C th j( appij I iau1 '" » ina'o 1 i I y | < ,|enerate 
options or alternative actions indicated that the choice to speak 
with the agents was not as a result of the exercise of his free 
will. 
A".-* another defendant, the methods of coercion 
employed here would probably not be sufficient to overcome an 
ability * in ill el I iqi nt » hi no e i I" whether or 
nnt +rs
 4 J e c . agents However, appellant's background 
and psychologica :ramewoiK created n situation where li*?1 was 
eAtreme • - *--P * I » u>i hn nines employed by the 
agents. -^.*aut > confession was involuntary because these 
coerciv* techniques hao causal elatior * appellant's 
contents of 
that confession violated appella it - _.:,.*. eje against self 
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incrimination and right to due process of law as described in the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, and Article I, Sections 6 and 12 of the 
Constitution of Utah* 
B 
THE ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF THE 
APPELLANT'S CONFESSION WAS ERROR BECAUSE THE 
AGENTS WHO INTERROGATED APPELLANT FAILED TO 
SCRUPULOUSLY HONOR THE ASSERTION OF HIS 
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme 
Court established a procedure that is to be followed before 
information received during a custodial interrogation may be 
admissible against a defendant. The court stated: 
.[T]he prosecution may not use 
statements, whether exculpatory or 
inculpatory, stemming from custodial 
interrogation of the defendant unless it 
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 
effective to secure the privilege against 
self-incrimination. By custodial 
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated 
by law enforcement officers after a person 
has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way. As for the procedural 
safeguards to be employed, unless other fully 
effective means are devised to inform accused 
persons of their right to silence and to 
assure a continuous opportunity to exercise 
it, the following measures are required. 
Prior to any questioning, the person must be 
warned that he has a right to remain silent, 
that any statement he does make may be used 
as evidence against him, and that he has a 
right to the presence of an attorney, either 
retained or appointed. The defendant may 
waive effectuation of these rights, provided 
the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently. If, however, he indicates in 
any manner and at any stage of the process 
that he wishes to consult with an attorney 
before speaking there can be no questioning. 
Likewise, if the individual is alone and 
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indicates in any manner that he does not wish 
to be interrogated, the police may not 
question him. The mere fact that he may have 
answered some questions or volunteered some 
statements on his own does not deprive him of 
the right to refrain from answering any 
further inquiries until he had consulted with 
an attorney and thereafter consents to be 
questioned. [footnote omitted] 
3 -
The threshold questioi ' analyzing - Miranda issue IF 
whether the defendant w-^ •- ustody. in tn: v-~ | 
pi nn i p
 A v cv.. - r,. r t ee:. 
day siege - landcuffed and take: L <T staging area where 
t vos transferred * second c^*r 
»• v * ^ second car that 
appellant made -:•- ncriminatinc statemei * -, "There r. no 
questior tna* a; r" ant was m ~ '*•.•" time In11 nii-kJe i In 
t .. ant was *h€ . c-o . .e Miranda warning and 
signed a waiver, He answered seveiJ1 questions and then declined 
answer any more. Den I 111 m n  < i h > ;ww diiv I m il lie r questions 
-i i fated an assertion of his privilege against self-
incrimination.' Appellant declined to answer questions very 
shortly af ter he was g i ven I II1<• M i iMIId<i w«11 n 111<J 
Once a person asserts his pi ivil ege against self 
incriminatior manner ihp Supreme Court ii i Miranda 
described the procedure to be fnl I owed: 
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent 
procedure is clear. If the individual 
indicates In any manner, at any time prior to 
or during questioning, that he wishes to 
remain silent, the interrogation must cease. 
At this point he has shown that he intends to 
exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any 
statement taken after the person invokes hi s 
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privilege cannot be other than the product of 
compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the 
right to cut off questioning, the setting of 
in-custody interrogation operates on the 
individual to overcome free choice in 
producing a statement after the privilege has 
been once invoked. [footnote omitted] 
384 U.S. at 473-474. 
Although this language would seem to indicate that an 
assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination would cut 
off all questioning, the Court has modified that statement. In 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), the Court upheld the use 
of statements taken from a suspect during custodial interrogation 
after he had asserted his right to remain silent. However, in 
allowing the use of such statements, the Court emphasized the 
fact that the defendant's right to cut off questioning had been 
scrupulously honored. This was made clear by a number of 
limiting factors: When the suspect asserted his privilege, all 
questioning ceased immediately. There was a two hour interval 
between the two interrogations. The second interrogation took 
place in a different location than the first interrogation. 
Different officers conducted the second interrogation. The 
second interrogation had completely different subject matter than 
the first. At the outset of the second interrogation, the 
suspect was given another full and complete warning of his 
constitutional rights. 
If the defendant initiates a conversation with officers 
and makes incriminating statements after asserting his privilege 
against self incrimination, those statements will be admissible 
against him. In State v. Easthope, 510 P.2d 933, 29 Ut. 2d 400 
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(1973), the defendant had been arrested for a rape. After being 
given a Miranda warning, he indicated that he did not want to 
make a statement. The defendant then asked the officers what the 
basis was for his arrest. The officer indicated that the 
defendant had been identified in a lineup. The defendant 
responded that he did not understand how anybody could identify 
him with a silk stocking over his face. The court found that to 
be a voluntary statement. 
The situation in this case is clearly distinguishable 
from Easthope. Appellant was questioned by ATF agents Galyon and 
Garcia in a car as they drove to Salt Lake City. After several 
minutes, appellant declined to answer further questions. Agent 
Garcia then engaged in a colloquy that was clearly intended to 
evoke responses from appellant that would lead to a discussion of 
13 the bombing, siege and final shooting. The agent's remarks 
about his own family and confusion over the cause of the bombing 
and siege are analogous to the "Christian Burial Speech" 
discussed in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).14 In that 
case the defendant had been charged with murder. While being 
transported by a detective, the defendant was told that it would 
snow that night and that the little girl's body (the homicide 
victim) may not be found. The detective then remarked that the 
parents of the girl were entitled to give her a Christian burial. 
The Court held that the detective deliberately and designedly set 
13 
See Point I.A., supra, at pages 19-20. 
14 
Reversed on other grounds, sub nom Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 
431 (1984). 
out to elicit information from the defendant. The Court also 
noted that technique was more effective than formal 
, . 1 5 interrogation. 
The issue of what constitutes "interrogation" was 
discussed in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). The 
Court in Innis described interrogation as express questioning or 
its functional equivalent. The functional equivalent of express 
questioning was defined as words or actions by the officers that 
those officers should have known are reasonably likely to elicit 
an incriminating response. Statements about missing one's own 
family and rhetorical questions about the cause of this incident 
were reasonably likelyf in this situation, to elicit an 
incriminating response from appellant. The family's responses to 
agents' requests for surrender involved long dissertations about 
the causes of the family's problems and reasons for the bombing 
and siege. Consequently, appellant was subjected to the 
functional equivalent of interrogation. 
This case is also clearly distinguishable from Michigan 
v. Moslev. The agents in the instant case discussed the same 
subjects as had previously been discussed. Appellant was not 
given a new Miranda warning, nor was he reminded of the previous 
warning. The amount of time that passed between the initial 
assertion of the privilege and the continued questioning was only 
15 
The defendant led the officers to the body. The court held 
that the statements and the discovery of the body violated the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel as he was 
represented by counsel at the time the statements were made. In 
Nix v. Williams, supra, the evidence of the body was found to be 
admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. 
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a matter of minutes. At the United States Marshal's office the 
questioning continued. Appellant was reminded of the Miranda 
warning; however, a new and full warning was not given. 
Furthermore, agent Garcia continued to be involved in the 
questioning. The subject matter of the interview continued to be 
the same. 
Appellant's request to cut off all questioning was not 
scrupulously honored. The agents refused to cut off the 
interrogation and were able to break appellant's resistance. 
Seef Michigan v. Mosley, supra. The responses to these questions 
are presumed to be the product of compulsion, Oregon v. Elstad, 
470 U.S. 298 (1985). The statements of agent Garcia were 
reasonably likely to evoke a response from appellant. Further 
questioning did in fact occur. Consequently, appellant was 
subjected to a subsequent interrogation. Rhode Island v. Innis, 
446 U.S. 291 (1980). The admission of these statements into 
evidence violated appellant's privilege against self-
incrimination and was error. 
C 
THE ERROR IN ADMITTING APPELLANT'S CONFESSION 
WAS PREJUDICIAL. 
The error in admitting appellant's confession involved 
constitutional questions. When error at trial is of 
constitutional magnitude the court must employ a standard of 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in determining if the error is 
prejudicial. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
In this casef the only direct evidence that appellant 
shot a firearm during the arrest attempt came from his 
confession. The circumstantial evidence available failed to put 
appellant in the room from which the shots were fired. Nor did 
such evidence establish that he fired the rifle in question. The 
circumstantial evidence tending to prove that fact included the 
following: The room from which the shots were fired was 
appellant's bedroom, appellant was observed in the window as 
Addam Swapp surrendered himself after being wounded, the firearm 
that was the source of the fatal bullet had been purchased by 
appellant only a matter of days before the bombing, and that 
firearm was located in appellant's bedroom. 
This evidence is not sufficient to rebut the prejudice 
from the admission of appellant's confession to shooting from his 
bedroom window. The error in admitting this evidence was 
prejudicial. The offense of manslaughter, for which appellant 
was convicted was based on this confession. Consequently, this 
court should reverse appellant's judgment and conviction and 
remand the case to the district court for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The first issue that this court must determine is 
whether the State introduced sufficient evidence to justify the 
manslaughter conviction. The evidence was sufficient to 
establish only the offense of negligent homicide rather than the 
greater offense of manslaughter. Appellant's conviction should 
be reversed and the case remanded to the district court with an 
order to impose judgment for the class A misdemeanor rather than 
the second degree felony. The error in admitting appellant's 
statement was prejudicial. This court should reverse appellant's 
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conviction and remand the case for a new trial based on the use 
of this evidence. If this court finds that the evidence was 
insufficient and that a new trial is warranted, the case should 
be ordered remanded for a new trial on the offense of negligent 
homicide, a class A misdemeanor. 
DATED this day of August, 1990. 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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